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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
--------------
--------------
-------------
SHERMAN G. ANDREW, 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 15,145 
GORDON B. SWAPP, dba SWAPP 
REAL ESTATE COMPANY and 
LEONARD M. STILLMAN, dba 
STILLMAN CONSTRUCTION; 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, a 
Corporation, 
Defendant-
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant, 
Gordon B. Swapp, as the owner, seller and builder of a home in 
Provo, Utah. The action was based upon an alleged Uniform 
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase. The plaintiff 
claime<l that the respondent failed to complete his agreement 
according to the terms of the alleged Uniform Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This matter was tried before the Honorable Allen 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
B. Sorensen, in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah 
County, sitting without a jury. The complaint was dismissej 
as against the defendant Stillman and was heard as to defen-
dant Swapp. The Court found that there was no enforceable 
contract upon which plaintiff could recover but did award 
to the plaintiff out of equity the sum of $635.00 special 
damages and $10.00 nominal damages together with Court 
costs in the sum of $74.60. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
It is the position of the respondent that the judg-
ment of the trial court should be affirmed and that responder• 
be awarded his costs and attorney's fees incurred in respond-
ing to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sometime in the spring of 1974, March through Mav 
of that year, the appellant, Sherman Andrew, came into the 
office of the respondent, Gordon Swapp, and indicated that 
the respondent had recently completed a home for a friend of 
Mr. Andrew; and he wanted to know if a home could be built 
for him on a lot owned by the respondent in the Provo area. 
Discussion was had between the parties with regard to down 
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payment and the possible cost of the home. Mr. Andrew indi-
cated that he did not have enough money for a down payment 
h11t what he proposed to do was have Mr. Swapp build the home 
cheaply enough to get a high appraisal so that he could use 
80% to 90% of the difference in the two figures for his down 
payment. Mr. Swapp explained to him that this was strictly 
against the law; and in his opinion, it could not be done. 
In order for that to be accomplished, Mr. Swapp would have 
to certify that the appraisal price was also the sales price 
which Mr. Swapp was not willing to do. 
Over the next two to three months, Andrew was in 
Swapp's office almost weekly until finally Mr. Swapp indi-
cated that he would build a house on a lot owned by Mr. Swapp; 
and when the home was finished, and if Mr. Andrew could raise 
a down payment to secure a loan and pay the purchase price 
of the home, Mr. Swapp would sell the home to him. Mr. Andrew 
inquired what type of a house was to be built. Mr. Swapp said 
that a four level split with a two car garage was to be con-
structed. Mr. Andrew asked if two changes in the regular 
floorplan for him could be made and also if Mr. Andrew could 
pick the color of brick, paint etc. Mr. Swapp agreed to 
those requests provided that the color of the brick would be 
compatible with what others would want if Mr. Andrew could 
not get the loan for the purchase of the property. There 
-3-
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was a verbal agreement between the parties as to that condi-
tion. Thereafter, Mr. Swapp went to Deseret Federal Savings 
and Loan in Provo and inquired concerning another construct\,-
loan for the construction of the home in question. Deseret 
Federal indicated to him that he had seven loans on spec 
homes in process and that they were reluctant to let him 
obtain another loan. However, they did indicate that if 
Mr. Swapp had one pre-sold or one or two of the homes under 
construction were sold, they would go ahead and allow the 
constructi.:in of the home discussed between Andrew and Swapp. 
Swapp explained to Deseret Federal what Andrew's proposal 
was and what Mr. Swapp was willing to do. Deseret Federal 
indicated that if Mr. Swapp could show some evidence that 
Mr. Andrew was interested in purchasing the home that they 
would go along with the financing for Mr. Swapp. 
Mr. Swapp contacted Mr. Andrew and asked him to 
come into his office wherein Mr. Swapp explained the problem , 
to him indicating that if he wanted to sign an Earnest Money 
Agreement showing that he wanted to buy the home, Mr. Swapp 
would see if Deseret Federal would let him start on the home 
with out the financing by Mr. Andrew. Mr. Swapp also explaicC: 
that inasmuch as they did not know what the final price wouli 
be on the home to be constructed they would use the apprais 3-
figure and make the adjustment later as to the ultimate pdci 
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He also explained to Mr. Andrew that he could not take any 
money down and that the details on financing would have to 
wait until the home was nearing completion so they could 
establish the final price. Mr. Andrew agreed to this and, 
thereafter, the Earnest Money Agreement in question in this 
matter dated June 4, 1974, was prepared. The Earnest Money 
Agreement was taken to Deseret Federal by Mr. Swapp. When 
Deseret Federal obtained the agreement, they indicated to 
Mr. Swapp that as a practical matter the agreement had no 
value to them; but if Mr. Swapp would have Mr. Andrew come 
into the office and make an application for a loan and give 
them opportunity to check Mr. Andrew's credit, they would 
issue to Mr. Swapp the construction loan, which was ultimately 
issued on June 17, 1974, for $29,600,00. 
During the time that the home was under the early 
stages of construction, Mr. Andrew was constantly on the job 
harassing the workman there and interfering with the construc-
tion of the home. Mr. Swapp agreed to make the two changes 
which the parties had originally talked of. However, many 
other changes were made by Mr. Andrew without the consent 
of the contractor or Mr. Swapp. Many of the problems experi-
enced in being able to comolete the home were caused by Mr. 
Andrew's constant interference during the period of construc-
tion. Mr. Swapp found that change after change was being 
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made or requested by Mr. Andrew which was never okayed by 
Mr. Swapp. Mr. Swapp ran out of money and had to increase 
the construction loan to $31,500.00. In January or the ear' 
part of February, 1975, Mr. Swapp asked the Andrews to come 
into his office as he desired to discuss with them the pur-
chase of the home. Mr. Swapp found that Mr. Andrew had never 
applied for a loan and had made changes in the home totaling 
several thousand dollars. Mr. Swapp advised Mr. Andrew of 
the difficulties in construction, of his interference with 
the home, and of the changes involved, and also advised him 
of the increased costs in the construction of the home. On 
April 9, 1975, Mr. Swapp again ran out of money in construe-
ting the home and increased the construction loan to $38,~00. 
The total amount on the home was due and payable on or before 
September 1, 1975. During the period of approximately 18 
months from the time of the initial discussion between the 
parties and the time the home was foreclosed against by 
Deseret Federal Saving and Loan, Andrew never applied for 
a loan as he promised he would. 
No money was ever received from the appellant and 
no contract was ever signed by the parties with regard to 
the ultimate construction of the home, completion date, etc· 
The Court's findings that there was not, in fact, an enforce· i 
able contract and that the only recovery allowed by Andre• ! 
-6-
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against Swapp was based upon equity should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
EVEN WHEN THE PROCEEDINGS TO BE REVIEW ARE 
IN EQUITY, THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND 
JUDGMENT ARE PRESUMED CORRECT AND SHOULD 
BE VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO 
THE RESPONDENT 
The relief prayed for by the respondent herein 
is based upon equity. Article VIII, Section 9 of the Utah 
Constitution allows the Supreme Court to review questions 
of law and fact in equity cases. Crockett v. Nish, 106 Utah 
241, 147 P.2d 853 (1944). In an appropriate case, this court 
can substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, 
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d,1359 (Utah 1974), but it has 
been made abundantly clear that this does not amount to a 
trial de novo on the merits. The appellant has the burden 
of proving by a clear preponderance of the evidence that the 
trial court's findings and judgment are erroneous. The 
Supreme Court will review the evidence and all inferences 
fairly to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to 
the trial court's findings and judgment. Olsen v. Park 
Daughters Investment Co., 29 Utah2d 421, 511 P.2d 145 (1973). 
As the Court stated in Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 
Utah2d 286, 495 P.2d 811 (1972): 
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It is true, as plaintiff asserts, that this 
action to avoid deeds is one in equity upon 
which this court has both the prerogative and 
the duty to review and weigh the evidence, 
and to determine the facts. However, in 
the practical application of that rule, it 
is well established in our decisional law 
that due to the advantaged position of the 
trial court, in close proximity to the parties 
and witnesses, there is indulged a presump-
tion of correctness of his findings and 
judgment, with the burden upon the appellant 
to show they were in error; and where the 
evidence is in conflict we do not upset his 
findings merely because we may have reviewed 
the matter differently, but do so only if the 
evidence clearly preponderates against them. 
It is the position of this respondent that the 
ruling of the trial court should not be disturbed and that 
the standard of review should be adhered to in this case. 
The language in the case of Nielson v. Rasmussen, 558 P.2d 
511 (Utah 1976) is applicable in the case before the court: 
This court will not disturb the trial court 
in its findings unless we say as a matter of 
law that no one could reasonably find as that 
trial court did. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING IS CORRECT THAT 
NO LEGAL AND ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT EXISTED 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
One of the first principles of contract law is tha: 
there be a mutuality of assent in the formation of a contrac:. 
The principle is fundamental that a party 
cannot be held to have contracted if there 
-8-
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was no assent, and this is so both as to 
express contracts and contracts implied 
in fact. There must be mutual assent or 
a meeting of the minds on all essential 
elements or terms in order to form a 
binding contract. 
(F)or a contract to be binding, the parties 
thereto must have a distinct and common 
intention which is communicated by each 
party to the other. 17 Am Jur 2d 354-355 
Contracts §18. ' 
The Utah Supreme Court has affirmed this principle 
on many occasions. In Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 
P.2d 695 (1976) the court stated: 
In order to find any contract,. .it is 
essential that it appear there was an 
express or implied meeting of the minds 
of the parties on the agreement. 
Also, in E.B. Wicks Co. v. Moyle, 103 Utah 554, 137 P.2d 342, 
the court stated that "The 'mutual assent' essential to a 
contract requires assent by all parties to the same thing in 
the same sense, so that their minds meet as to all the terms." 
The court indicated in its finding that the plain-
tiff was entitled to recover against the defendant Gordon 
Swapp out of equity only. At the trial of the case, the 
burden was upon the appellant to prove the matters presented 
to the court. The court found that "The only evidence suffi-
cient to carry plaintiff's burden, thereby allowing the plain-
tiff to recover judgment against the defendant, Gordon B. 
Swapp,. " was on the basis of equity rather than contract. 
-9-
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The trial court's finding that there was not a binding con-
tract was in accordance with all of the testimony placed 
before it. The Earnest Money Agreement in question was not 
a fully integrated agreement incorporating all of the terms 
and conditions which the parties had discussed. In this 
instance, it was merely a tool used in negotiations by the 
parties. In the case of Erickson v. Bastian, 98 Utah 587, 
102 P.2d 310 (1940), the court stated that the purpose of a 
written contract is to put in definite and evidentiary form 
the terms upon which the minds of the parties have met. 
Inasmuch as the minds of the parties herein did not meet as 
to all of the terms, and since the complete terms were never 
incorporated into the proposed Earnest Money Agreement, the 
document which appellant claims is a contract is not a defi-
nite and evidentiary form of the terms about which the parti<' 
should have agreed. 
The trial court was correct in concluding that the 
parties had not reached an agreement which was definite, 
enforceable and in an evidentiary form. It is obvious from 
the testimony given to the trial court that it was never the 
intention of the parties to rely upon the Earnest Money Agree· 
ment as the ultimate contract for the purchase of the home 
which respondent was constructing. The court in Bunnell'!..:-
Bills, 13 Utah2d 83, 368 P. 2d 597 (1962) stated that a bind· 
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ing contract can exist only where there has been mutual assent 
by the parties manifesting their intention to be bound by its 
terms. In the case in chief, neither party intended to be 
bound by the total and complete terms of the proposed Earnest 
Money document. Furthermore, in the Bunnell case, the court 
asked two pertinent questions which should be asked in the 
present case. First, "Is there substantial evidence to sup-
port the trial court's finding that the defendant had mani-
fested an intention to be bound by the terms that were offered 
by the plaintiff?"; and second, "And if so, in light of the 
circumstances under which the agreement was entered, can the 
intention of the parties be ascertained with reasonable cer-
tainty?" In the instant case, the trial court answered both 
of these questions in the negative. That finding should not 
be disturbed. 
"The creation of a contract requires a meeting of 
the minds of the parties; the burden of so proving is on the 
party who claims there is a contract." B&R Supply Co. v. 
Bringhurst, 29 Utah2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216 (1972). From the 
evidence before the trial court, the court could not conclude 
that there had been a meeting of the minds. The court in 
its findings specifically states that the appellant had 
failed to meet its burden by way of proof. In addition to 
the difficulties with regard to the requirement of a meeting 
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of the minds, the proposed agreement is ambiguous since it 
does not include details as to financing, completion dates, 
etc. 
Where the offerer, using ambiguous lan-
guage, reasonably means one thing, and 
the off eree reasonably understands differ-
ently, there is no contract. 17 Am Jur 
2d 358, Contracts §22. 
In the case before the court, the proposed contract is not 
only ambiguous but fails to specify many of the terms and 
conditions required to meet the requirements for a written 
agreement. In Paulsen v. Coombs, 253 P.2d 621, 123 Utah 
49 (1953), the court said that the principle of preserving 
the sanctity of a written contract only applies when the 
contract represents the intent of the parties. The court 
has on many instances stated that in interpreting a contract, 
the objective is to determine what the parties intended at 
the time the document was executed. Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16 
Utah2d 204, 398 P.2d 207 (1964). 
In ascertaining the meaning of the words in a con-
tract, the intention of the parties is controlling; and where 
it is susceptible to different interpretations, the extrane· 
ous evidence is admissible to show intention. Bennett v. 
Robinson's Medical Mart Inc., 18 Utah2d 186, 417 P.2<l 761 
(1966). In the document in question, the interpretation 
of the parties and the intention of thl' appell;int and resron-
-12-
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dent cannot be specifically ascertained without reference 
to other evidence. 
An examination of the document in question presents 
a patent ambiguity in the document itself as it is drawn. 
The Agreement is but a cursory outline of vague negotiations 
made by the parties. There is no specific date of completion, 
no specific form of financing, and merely an appraisal of the 
price of the home yet to be built. Since such ambiguity 
exists, parol evidence should be admitted to show the inten-
tion of the parties, 
The intention of the parties to a written 
contract must ordinarily be determined by 
an examination of the writing, but if it 
is ambiguous and the intention of the parties 
cannot be determined from the writings itself, 
parol evidence is admissible to show such 
intention, Milford State Bank v. West Field 
Canal and Irrigation Co., 108 Utah 528, 162 
P.2d 101. 
Finally, it may be said that ambiguity, such as exists in the 
Earnest Money Agreement proposed by the appellant herein, 
allows the court to took to the total circumstances involved 
in the case to determine the intent of the two parties. ~ 
S. Ludlow Investment Co. v. Salt Lake County, 28 Utah2d 139, 
499 P.2d 283 (1972). 
It is a fact that no money exchanged hands between 
the appellant and respondent with regard to an Earnest Money 
payment. Therefore, no good and valuable consideration existed 
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for the formation of the contract. The plaintiff did not 
give legal consideration to the defendant. In Gasser v. 
Horne, 557 P.2d 154 (1976), the court stated that the prin-
cipal must be bound to give some legal consideration to the 
other party by conferring a benefit upon them or by suffering 
a legal detriment at their request. No legal consideration 
nor detriment was proved to have been given by the appellant 
in the case at hand. 
Finally, the court in its Finding of Fact, No. 
4, found that: 
.plaintiff is entitled to recover 
against the defendant as stated herein 
on the basis of unjust enrichment and 
equity only. The Court, therefore, finds 
that the plaintiff is not entitled to an 
award of attorney's fees inasmuch as the 
Court finds that no recovery is allowed 
the plaintiff on the basis of contract. 
In addition thereto, the trial court refused evidence on 
this matter on petition since the plaintiff neglected to 
place such evidence as there might have been before the court 
at the proper time. The plaintiff claimed that the contract 
expressly called for an attorney's fee. However, if it is 
established that there is no contract in fact, then there 
can be no award of attorney's fee. Furthermore, even if a 
contract were held to be in existence, the Utah Supreme Cour: 
has held that attorney's fees are awardable only if express)·: 
contracted for or provided by statute and if there is eviden .. 
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as to the necessity and the reasonableness of such fees. 
Walker v. Sandwick, 548 P.2d 1273 (1976). The court's find-
ings that the award to the plaintiff was based upon equity 
only and not upon contact is sufficient to allow the matter 
to be resolved on appeal in favor of the respondent. 
CONCLUSION 
It is, therefore, the position of respondent that 
the trial court's findings and conclusions should be affirmed; 
that this court should conclude that no contract existed 
between the parties upon which the trial court could legally 
act in favor of the appellant; and in light of the record as 
it appears, that respondent should be awarded his costs and 
fees in connection with this ~ppeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
,!L.JJ$'fi ~G AND WILSON 
Attorneys for Respondent 
84 East 100 South 
Provo, UT 84601 
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